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ADMINISTRATIVE SAVINGS FROM SYNCHRONIZING SOCIAL WELFARE
PROGRAMS AND TAX PROVISIONS I
by Jonathan Barry Forman
2
Introduction
The federal government operates a multibillion dollar social welfare system
of enormous complexity. Dozens of federal programs provide social welfare
assistance to individuals for retirement, disability, health, education, housing,
public assistance, employment, and other needs. Indeed, some 75 programs provide
such assistance just to low-income individuals. 3 Still other programs, like Social
Security and Medicare, provide assistance to virtually all individuals.
The federal government also provides social welfare benefits to individuals
through a panoply of special income tax deductions, exclusions, and credits known
1 Copyright 1992 by Jonathan Barry Forman.
2 Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University,
M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A.
(Economics) 1983, George Washington University.
3 Coordinating Federal Assistance Programs for the Economically Disadvantaged:
Recommendations and Background Materials ix, 3 (National Commission for Employment
Policy Special Report No. 31, 1991 ) [hereinafter National Commission for Employment
Policy]. See also Domestic Policy Council, Low Income Opportunity Working Group, Up
From Dependency, A New National Public Assistance Strategy: Report to the President by
the Domestic Policy Council (1986) [hereinafter Domestic Policy Council] (59 programs);
Needs-Based Programs - Eligibility and Benefit Factors (U.S. General Accounting Office
Report No. HRD-86-107FS, 1986) (95 assistance programs for needy people) [hereinafter
Needs-Based Programs].
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as "tax expenditures." 4 For example, the deduction for home mortgage interest
helps individuals buy houses. Similarly, the dependent care credit helps workers
pay for employment-related child care.
Unfortunately, the current system developed with relatively little
consideration ever given to coordination among the various social welfare programs
and tax expenditures. This lack of coordination has made the current system
inequitable, inefficient, overly complicated, and expensive to administer. First, the
current system is inequitable, for example, because similarly situated families often
receive widely differing benefits. Second, the current system is inefficient, for
example, because many beneficiaries face work and marriage disincentives as a
result of cumulative tax rates on earnings of 80 or 90%. Third, the current system
is overly complicated, for example, because of the thousands of pages of governing
statutes and regulations. Finally, the current system has unnecessarily high
administrative costs, for example, because of the overlap and duplication among the
various social welfare programs and tax expenditures.
4 In a very real sense, tax expenditures are also "programs," but this article will
generally use the term "program" to refer to positive expenditure programs and the term "tax
expenditure" to refer to those tax provisions that provide similar benefits.
6
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Academics have complained about this lack of coordination for years. 5
Recently, both Congress 6 and the Executive Branch 7 have also begun to take this
5 See, e.g., Income Redistribution (Colin D. Campbell ed., 1977); Income-Tested
Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 1982) [hereinafter
Income-Tested Transfer Programs]; Gordon H. Lewis & Richard J. Morrison, Interactions
Among Social Welfare Programs (University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty
Discussion Paper No. 866-88, 1988); Integrating Income Maintenance Programs (Irene Lurie
ed., 1975); James R. Storey, Public Income Transfer Programs: The Incidence of Multiple
Benefits and Issues Raised by Their Receipt, in Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, Joint Economic
Committee, Studies in Public Welfare (1972); and Peter Gottschalk, Principles of Tax
Transfer Integration and Carter's Welfare Reform Proposal, 13 J. Hum. Resources 332
(1978).
6 See, e.g., Continuing Efforts to Coordinate and Simplify Major Federal
Assistance Programs: Hearing Before the Domestic Task Force of the House Select
Committee on Hunger, 100th Cong., 1 st Sess. (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter Hearing
Before the Domestic Task Force]; Needs-Based Programs, supra note 1; WelfareSimplification - Projects to Coordinate Services for Low-Income Families (U.S. General
Accounting Office Report No. HRD-86-124FS, 1986); Welfare Simplification - Thirty-Two
States' Views on Coordinating Services for Low-Income Families (U.S. General Accounting
Office Report No. HRD-87-6FS, 1986); Welfare Simplification - States' Views on
Coordinating Services for Low-Income Families (U.S. General Accounting Office Report No.
HRD-87-11OFS, 1987).
7 See, e.g., National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1. The
National Commission for Employment Policy is currently compiling a book of materials on
national, state, and local coordination issues. Id. at ii.
Also, the newly-created Welfare Simplification and Coordination
Advisory Committee is holding hearings on the interactions among public assistance
programs and is to issue its final report by July 1, 1993. See, e.g., Food and Nutrition Serv.,
Dep't of Agriculture, Welfare Simplification and Coordination Advisory Committee Meeting,
57 Fed. Reg. 31,349 (July 15, 1992).
Finally, See also Domestic Policy Council, supra note 1, in which
President Reagan's Low Income Opportunity Working Group described the problem as
follows:
Thinking about these programs (AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid, for
example) as separate entities, however, does not help us understand how they work in the
real world. In that world, and especially from the point of view of the welfare recipient, all
of these programs combine to operate as a single complex and bewildering system. Even
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matter seriously. Indeed, even a casual observer can recognize that there appears to
be a lack of comprehensive thought behind the "crazy quilt" of overlapping federal
social welfare programs and tax expenditures.
The purpose of this article is to explain some of the problems of the current
system and to suggest how to provide for better coordination among the federal
government's social welfare programs and tax expenditures. Part I of this article
describes the major social welfare programs and tax expenditures, and Part II of this
article discusses the administrative costs associated with them. Part III of this
article then looks at how better synchronization among the various social welfare
programs and tax expenditures could reduce administrative costs.
Finally, Part IV of this article considers how combining the major social
welfare programs and tax expenditures into a rational, integrated system could
achieve even greater administrative savings. In that regard, the author offers a
proposal to replace most of the current social welfare system with a comprehensive
system of refundable tax credits and related programs. First, refundable per capita
tax credits of, say, $1,200 per year would provide a minimal safety net. Second,
additional refundable tax credits would be available to certain individuals based
upon determinations of employability and need made by a single agency at the local
level. In addition, a comprehensive federal health plan would ensure that nobody
though each program was designed to meet some specific need, together they interact to
produce a system of conflicting rules and benefits. Id. at 27.
8
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would lose health coverage by working. Finally, education, training, and other
services would be provided at the local level through a single agency.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM
Dozens of federal social welfare programs and tax expenditures provide
assistance to individuals for retirement, disability, health, education, housing,
public assistance, employment, and other needs. The vast majority of these social
welfare programs transfer cash or in-kind benefits (§,g& food or medical care)
directly to individuals, and the vast majority of these social welfare tax expenditures
transfer benefits indirectly to individuals, via reduced taxes. This Part of the article
explains the major social welfare transfer programs and the major tax provisions
related to social welfare.
8
A. THE MAJOR TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL SOCIAL
WELFARE SYSTEM
Social welfare policy analysts generally differentiate between transfer
programs that are "means-tested" and transfer programs that are not. For means-
8 Social welfare assistance that is not transferred to individuals per se (i.e.,
education grants to schools) and transfers to individuals that are not directly related to social
welfare (i.e., farm subsidies) are beyond the scope of this article.
Also, except where otherwise expressly noted, the source for most of the
facts and figures in the text is the so-called "Green Book." Staff of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1992 Green
Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter Green Book].
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tested programs (i Medicaid, food stamps, AFDC, and SSI), eligibility and
benefits depend upon an individual's need, as measured by the individual's income
and assets. For non-means-tested programs (rg& social "insurance" programs like
Social Security and Medicare), eligibility is based on other criteria such as age and
work history.
1. Means-Tested Programs
a. Medicaid
Medicaid is a federal-state matching entitlement program which provides
medical assistance for needy persons who are aged, blind, disabled, members of
families with dependent children, and certain other pregnant women and children.
States design and administer their programs within federal guidelines, and the
federal government reimburses them for 50 to 83% of their costs. In fiscal year
1990, the Medicaid program served 25.3 million people at a total cost of $72.5
billion (of which, the federal government paid $41.1 billion). The average
expenditure per person was $2,700.
b. Food assistance
A number of federal programs provide food assistance to needy
households. The largest of these, the food stamp program, is administered by the
states, but it is 100% federally-financed. In general, food stamp benefits are issued
in the form of booklets of coupons, which participating households use to buy food
items for home preparation and consumption. Food stamp benefits are a function of
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a household's size, its counted monthly income, and a maximum monthly benefit
level. In fiscal year 1991, the federal government spent about $20 billion to provide
food stamps to 24 million individuals. Monthly food stamp benefits averaged $64
per person and $170 per household.
The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) provides food assistance and nutritional screening to needy
pregnant and postpartum women and their infants, as well as to needy children up
to age 5. This program is federally funded, but it is administered by the States.
WIC has categorical, income, and nutritional risk requirements for eligibility, and it
does not serve all who are eligible. In fiscal year 1991, the federal government
spent about $2.1 billion to assist some 4.5 million women, infants, and children.
The average monthly cost of a WIC food package was $31.67 per participant.
Also, the National School Lunch Program and the School Breakfast
Program provide subsidized meals to children at participating public and private
schools and nonprofit residential institutions. Free and reduced-price meals are
targeted to help children who live in needy households. For fiscal year 1991, the
federal government spent about $4.8 billion on these two programs.
c. Supplemental Security Income (SSD
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a federal program that provides
cash benefits to needy persons who satisfy the program criteria for age, blindness, or
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disability. In 1992, the maximum federal benefit for an individual is $422 per
month, and the maximum federal benefit for couples is $633 per month; however,
some states provide small additional supplements. In 1991 some 5.1 million SSI
recipients received a total of $18.5 billion in benefits ($14.8 billion from the federal
government)
d. Aid to Families with Dendent Children (AFDC)
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) provides cash assistance
(through states) to needy families with dependent children and helps those families
become self-sufficient. AFDC provides cash welfare payments for: 1) needy
children who have been deprived of parental support or care because their father or
mother is absent from the home continuously, incapacitated, deceased, or
unemployed; and 2) certain others in the household of such child. States define
"need," set their own benefit levels, establish (within federal limitations) income
and resource limits, and administer the program or supervise its administration.
The federal government pays 50 to 80% of AFDC costs. In fiscal year 1991, almost
4.4 million households (12.6 million people) received total benefits of $20.3 billion.
The average payment per household was $388 per month.
e. Low-income home energy assistance progam (LIHEAP)
The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) helps low-
income families meet their energy-related expenses. For fiscal year 1991, the
federal government allotted $1.6 billion to the states for distribution to eligible low-
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income households to pay their heating or cooling bills, for low-cost weatherization,
and to assist households during energy-related emergencies. Some 5.8 million
households received these heating assistance benefits.
f. Federal housing assistance
A number of federal programs administered by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
provide housing assistance for low-income households. Most housing assistance is
provided in the form of traditional rental assistance or traditional homeowners'
assistance. Traditional rental assistance is provided through two basic approaches:
1) project-based aid, like the public housing program and the section 8 new
construction and substantial rehabilitation program; and 2) household-based
subsidies, like section 8 rental certificates and vouchers. Traditional homeowners'
assistance is provided in the form of mortgage-interest subsidies.
Federal housing assistance has never been provided as an entitlement to all
eligible low-income households. In fiscal year 1992, the federal government spent
$18.6 billion to provide housing assistance to some 5.5 million households. The
average subsidy per participating household was $4,120.
2. Non-Means-Tested Programs
a. Social Security
The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program provides monthly
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cash benefits to retired workers and their dependents and to survivors of insured
workers. The Disability Insurance (DI) program provides monthly cash benefits for
disabled workers under age 65 and their dependents. A worker builds protection
under these programs by working in employment that is covered by the Social
Security system and paying the applicable payroll taxes. At present, roughly 96
percent of the workforce is in covered employment.
At retirement, disability, or death, monthly Social Security benefits are
paid to insured workers and to their eligible dependents and survivors. In general,
OASI and DI benefits are related to the earnings history of the insured worker. In
December of 1991, there were 40.6 million beneficiaries in the OASI and DI
programs. The average payment to a retired worker was $629 per month, and the
average payment to a disabled worker was $609 per month, plus additional amounts
paid in the case of dependents.
b. Medicare
Medicare is a federal health care program for the aged and certain disabled
persons. It consists of two parts: the Hospital Insurance (HI; or part A) program;
and the supplementary medical insurance (part B) program. Persons age 65 and
older are automatically entitled to protection under part A (Le hospital care) if they
are "fully insured" under Social Security. Part B is voluntary program: paying a
premium of $31.80 per month (as of January 1, 1992) provides insurance coverage
for physician and certain other medical services. People under age 65 who are
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receiving monthly Social Security disability benefits are also eligible for Medicare
after a two-year wait.
In fiscal year 1993, some 31.5 million aged and 3.5 million disabled will
be covered by Medicare part A, and 30.9 million aged and 3.2 million disabled will
be covered under part B. The program costs are projected to grow from $116.7
billion in fiscal year 1991 to $145.6 billion in fiscal year 1993. Some 55% of
Medicare financing comes from payroll taxes, 26.3% from general revenues, and
the rest comes from premiums, interest, and other income.
c. Unemployment compensation
Unemployment compensation is a joint federal-state program that provides
cash benefits to individuals who have recently become unemployed. States
administer their programs within federal guidelines. Some 98% of all wage and
salary workers and 91% of all employed persons are covered by unemployment
compensation, about 106 million individuals in all.
Benefits are financed through Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
taxes, a gross tax of 6.2% on the first $7,000 paid annually by covered employers to
each employee. States set the benefit amounts as a fraction of the individual's
weekly wage up to some State-determined maximum. Unemployed persons usually
receive unemployment benefits for 26 weeks; however, the federal-state extended
benefits program provides for up to another 13 additional weeks. In fiscal year
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1991, the national average weekly benefit amount was $169 and the average
duration was 14.8 weeks, making the average total benefits $2,501.
3. Cost of the Major Federal Social Welfare Transfer Progmams
Table 1 summarizes the federal government's projected outlays for the major federal
social welfare transfer programs in fiscal years 1992 and, as available, 1993. Of
note, the overwhelming majority of federal transfer payments are not means-tested.
Indeed, in fiscal year 1993, Social Security and Medicare benefits alone are
projected to cost $443.3 billion, more than half of what the federal government will
spend on all entitlements and other mandatory spending categories ($750.6 billion).
On the other hand, the aggregate of all means-tested entitlement programs are
projected to cost just $161.6 billion in fiscal year 1993. 9
9 Using a somewhat different approach, the Bureau of the Census estimated that
the aggregate amount of federal and state transfers to individuals in 1990 was $391.3 billion.
Allen D. Manvel, Fiscal Facts & Figures: The Effects of Transfers and Taxes on Income,
Tax Notes 465-68 (January 27, 1992), summarizing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept of
Commerce, Measuring the Effects of Benefits and Taxes on Income and Poverty: 1990
(1991). Non-means tested transfers again accounted for most of the transfers ($323.1
billion): mainly Social Security ($249.7 billion), and Medicare ($73.4 billion). Means-
tested transfers accounted for just $68.2 billion: cash benefits - mostly AFDC ($31.0
billion), Medicaid ($14.9 billion), other in-kind transfers ($22.3 billion).
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Table 1. The Federal Government's Projected Outlays In Fiscal Year 1992 and 1993 for Major
Social Welfare Transfer Programs.
[Billions of dollars]
Program 1992 1993
Means-tested programs
Medicaid 68.4 79.6
Food stamps 23.2 22.9
wic 2.9 *
Supplemental security income 17.0 18.4
AFDC and child support enforcement 15.7 16.5
LIHEAP 1.7
Housing assistance 21.8 *
Non-means-tested programs
Social Security 284.5 300.6
Medicare 128.3 142.7
Unemployment compensation 34.9 26.3
* not presented in available tables.
SOURCE: Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1992
Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 1775-
78 (Comm. Print 1992).
B. THE MAJOR FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS RELATED TO SOCIAL
WELFARE
Of the $1.173 trillion that the federal government expects to raise in fiscal
year 1993, $513 billion is expected to come from individual income taxes and $449
billion from social insurance (Li. payroll) taxes. 10 These are discussed in turn.
1. The Individual Income Tax
A significant portion of the federal budget consists of direct payments
(expenditures) to individuals for retirement, health, public assistance, employment,
10 Green Book, supra note 6, at 1768. Only $110 billion was expected to come
from corporate income taxes and even less was expected to come from excise taxes, estate
and gift taxes, customs duties, and other categories.
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and disability benefits provided pursuant to entitlement programs. One may also
view the federal government as providing indirect payments to individuals, by
means of special income tax deductions, exclusions, and credits related to health
and other social policy objectives. These so-called "tax expenditures" are the focus
of this Section.
a. Overview of the Individual Income Tax
The individual income tax is imposed on a taxpayer's taxable income. In
general, a taxpayer's taxable income is equal to the taxpayer's gross income less
allowable deductions. In that regard, most taxpayers simply claim a standard
deduction and personal exemptions. Many taxpayers, however, claim certain
itemized deductions in lieu of the standard deduction. Also, certain other
deductions are allowed without regard to whether the taxpayer chooses to itemize.
A taxpayer's tentative tax liability (if any) is determined by applying 15,
28, and 31% rates to taxable income. The amount that the taxpayer must actually
pay with his or her tax return or, alternatively, will receive as a refund is equal to
the taxpayer's tentative tax liability minus allowable credits.
b. Standard deductions and personal exemptions
For 1992, the basic standard deduction amounts are $6,000 for married
couples filing jointly and surviving spouses, $5,250 for heads of households, $3,600
for unmarried individuals, and $3,000 for married individuals filing separately.
Aged or blind taxpayers generally are entitled to claim an additional standard
18
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deduction amount of $700, except that aged or blind single individuals can instead
claim an additional standard deduction amount of $900. The personal exemption
amount for 1992 is $2,300.
c. Income tax rates
For 1992, the 15% marginal tax rate extends to all taxable incomes up to
$35,800 for married couples filing jointly and surviving spouses; $28,750 for heads
of households; $21,450 for unmarried individuals; and $17,900 for married
individuals filing separately. For taxable incomes above those amounts, marginal
tax rates of 28% and 31% are applicable.
d. The earned income credit
The earned income credit is a refundable credit available to working
taxpayers who maintain a home for at least one child. I1 For 1992, the maximum
basic earned income credit for a family with one qualifying child is $1,324 (17.6%
of the first $7,520 of earned income), and the maximum basic earned income credit
for a family with two or more qualifying children is $1,384 (18.4% of the first
$7,520 of earned income). Also, a taxpayer who pays health insurance premiums
on a policy that includes at least one qualifying child may claim an additional
I Because it is refundable, the earned income credit is often numbered as one of
the many direct transfer programs operated by the federal government. Because the earned
income credit is first and foremost a tax provision, however, discussion of it has been
included here with the author's discussion of tax expenditure (indirect subsidy) provisions.
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health care earned income credit of up to $451 (6% of the first $7,520 of earned
income), and a taxpayer with a child under age 1 may elect to claim a supplemental
young child earned income credit of up to $376 (5% of the first $7,520 of earned
income). A taxpayer's total earned income credit begins phasing out at $11,840 of
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, earned income) and will be entirely phased out
at $22,370 of adjusted gross income (or, if greater, earned income).
In 1992, some 13.3 million families are expected to claim $10.7 billion in
earned income credits, and the average credit per family is expected to be $804.12
e. The dependent care credit
The dependent care credit is a non refundable credit for up to 30% of
employment-related dependent care expenses incurred by an individual who
maintains a household that includes one or more qualifying individuals. A
qualifying individual is a dependent under age 13 or a physically or mentally
incapacitated dependent or spouse. The maximum 30% credit rate is reduced, but
not below 20%, by 1 percentage point for each $2,000 (or fraction thereof) of
adjusted gross income above $10,000. Eligible employment-related expenses are 46
12 Of note, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (1990) provided for substantial increases in the maximum basic earned
income credit amounts to be phased in over a period of years. When the transition is
completed in 1995, the maximum basic earned income credit for a family with one qualifying
child is projected to be $1,934 (23% of the first $8,410 of earned income), and the maximum
basic earned income credit for a family with two or more qualifying children is projected to
be $2,103 (25% of the first $8,410 of earned income). Staff of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Overview of Entitlement Programs: 1991 Green Book:
Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means 897-905 (Comm. Print 1991).
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limited to $2,400 if there is one qualifying individual (maximum credit $720 = 30%
x $2,400), or $4,800 if there are two or more qualifying individuals (maximum
credit $1,440 = 30% x $4,800).
In 1992, some 6.4 million families are expected to claim $2.8 billion in
dependent care credits, and the average credit per family is expected to be $43 1.
Because the dependent care credit is not refundable, low-income families generally
do not claim the credit, and the overwhelming portion of the benefits are received
by middle- and upper-income families. 13
f. The income tax treatment of social welfare benefits
By long-standing administrative policy, public assistance payments are
excluded from gross income. Consequently, the values of AFDC, SSI, food stamps,
Medicaid, and housing assistance benefits are not subject to income taxation. The
value of Medicare is also excluded from gross income, and workers' compensation
benefits and the special benefits for disabled coal miners are excluded by statute.
On the other hand, unemployment compensation is subject to income taxation, and
as much as half of the Social Security and railroad retirement benefits received by
individuals with income over $25,000 and couples with income over $32,000 may
be subject to income taxation.
13 Green Book, supra note 6, at 1026-30.
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g. Other tax e2xnditures
Other tax expenditures that have a significant impact on social welfare
include: the net exclusion of private retirement plan contributions and earnings; the
exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical
care; the deduction for medical expenses; the exclusion for employer-provided
dependent care; and the tax credit for the elderly and disabled. There are also a
number of tax expenditures related to housing (i& the deduction for mortgage
interest; the deduction for property tax on owner-occupied housing, the deferral of
capital gain on sale of principal residence, and the exclusion of capital gain on sale
of residence of persons 55 and over).
h. Estimates of the revenue losses attributable to the income tax extenditures
related to retirement health poverty. employment, and disability
Table 2 provides estimates of the revenue losses attributable to most of the
above-described income tax expenditures in fiscal year 1993.14 The consolidated
revenue loss attributable to all the tax expenditures related to retirement, health,
poverty, employment, and disability was estimated to be $176.6 billion.
14 No revenue-loss estimates are available for the basic standard deduction,
personal exemption deductions, or the exclusion of public assistance payments, as the federal
government's revenue estimators consider these to be "normal" features of an income tax, not
tax expenditures.
22
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Table 2. Estimates of the Revenue Loss in Fiscal Year 1993 Attributable to the Tax
Expenditures Related to Retirement, Health, Poverty, Employment, and Disability.
[Billions of dollars]
Item Amount
Tax expenditures related to retirement:
Ii Net exclusion of private retirement plan contributions
and earnings 66.3
IN Exclusion of Social Security and railroad retirement benefits 24.5
Tax expenditures related to health:
l] Exclusions of employer contributions for medical insurance
premiums and medical care 46.4
09 Exclusion of Medicare Benefits 12.0
[] Deductibility of medical expenses 3.1
Tax expenditures related to poverty:
99 Earned income tax credit 10.9
0 Credit for child medical insurance premiums .7
[1 Exclusion of public assistance and SSI payments 
.4
Tax expenditures related to employment
19 Dependent care credit 2.8
I] Exclusion of employer-provided dependent care 
.4
[] Exclusion for benefits provided under cafeteria plans 2.9
0 Other 1.0
Tax expenditures related to elderly and disabled:
[] Exclusion of workers' compensation and special benefits for disabled coal miners 3.3
(A Additional standard deduction for elderly and blind 1.8
0 Tax credit for the elderly and disabled 
.1
Tax expenditures related to housing:
MJ Deductibility of mortgage interest 44.2
[] Deductibility of property tax on owner-occupied housing 13.3
[] Deferral of capital gains on sale of principal residence 13.2
[] Exclusion of capital gains on sale of residence of persons 55 and over 4.6
0 Other 5.4
SOURCE: Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Overview
of Entitlement Programs: 1992 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs
within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 984-85 (Comm. Print 1992).
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2. Social Insurance Taxes
Social insurance taxes are important to the present discussion primarily
because they are used to finance Social Security and many other social welfare
benefits. 15 Moreover, social insurance taxes are regressive; that is, they take a
greater percentage of the income of low-income taxpayers than of high-income
taxpayers. 16 Indeed, many, ff not most, American families pay more in social
insurance taxes than they do in individual income taxes.
17
a. Social Security paroll taxes
The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, the Disability
Insurance (DI) program, and the Hospital Insurance (HI, or Medicare part A)
program are each funded through separate trust funds. Persons build protection
under these "insurance" programs by working in employment or self-employment
that is "covered" by the Social Security system and by making the required payroll
15 Those interested in the more secondary issue of tax expenditures in the social
insurance taxes are encouraged to see Jonathan B. Forman, Would a Social Security Tar
Expenditure Budget Make Sense?, 5 Public Budgeting and Financial Management
(forthcoming Summer 1993).
16 First, social insurance taxes are imposed on earnings, a much narrower and
more regressive tax base than income. Second, unlike the income tax which has standard
deductions and personal exemptions, social insurance taxes are imposed from the very first
dollar of earnings. Third, unlike the income tax which has a progressive tax rate structure,
social insurance taxes are imposed at flat rates, and no social insurance taxes are collected on
earnings in excess of certain earnings caps (e.g., $55,500 for Social Securitys Old Age and
Survivors Insurance program).
17 See, e.g., Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101 st Cong., 1 st
Sess., Tax Progressivity and Income Distribution 11, 33 (Comm. Print 1990).
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tax "contributions" to those trust funds. For 1992, employees and employers each
pay a Social Security payroll tax of 7.65% of the first $55,500 of covered wages and
1.45% of covered wages from $55,500 to $130,200.18 Similarly, self-employed
individuals are required to pay Social Security taxes at a rate that equal to the
combined employee-employer rate of 15.3% on the first $55,500 of net earnings
from covered self-employment and 2.9% on net earnings from covered self-
employment from $55,500 to $130,200.
b. Other payroll taxes
Payroll-based taxes are also used to finance the unemployment
compensation program, the railroad retirement and unemployment programs, and
state workers' compensation programs.
C. OVERSIGHT AND ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE
TRANSFER PROGRAMS AND TAX PROVISIONS
Numerous congressional committees and Executive Branch agencies ARE
currently responsible for various pieces of the current social welfare system. For
example, as shown in Table 3, nine different congressional committees exercise
oversight and authorization responsibilities for just the most broad-based federal
18 Most economists believe that the burden of both the employee's and the
employer's portion of social security taxes falls on the employee. See, e.g., Joseph A.
Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 223-25 (5th ed. 1987).
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public assistance programs. 19 In addition, the Senate and House budget and
appropriations committees determine funding for these programs.2 0 Similarly, as
shown in Table 4, eight different agencies administer the most broad-based federal
public assistance programs. 2 1 Still more congressional committees and Executive
Branch agencies are involved in the remaining social welfare programs and tax
provisions.
Table 3. Congressional Oversight of Broad-based Federal Public Assistance Programs.
Program Senate Committee House Committee
Aid to Families with Finance Ways and Means
Food Stamps Agriculture, Nutrition. Agriculture
--- .............. . ..
. . .. .... . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .......................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...................
Supplemental Agriculture, Nutrition. Education and Labor
Food Progrm for and Foresl-y
Womn, Infants, arid
Head Stait Lao and Human Education and Labor
Resources
Social Services Block Grant Finance Ways and Mean
Source: Coordinating Federal Assistance Programs for the Economically Disadvantae: Rce medations and Background
Materials 10 (National Commission for Employmet Policy. Special Repot No. 31. 1991).
19 Still other conmttees review assistance programs that are more targeted on
particular groups like Indians or veterans.
20 Each of the principal non-means-tested social welfare programs (Social
Security, unemployment compensation, and Medicare) are also subject to review by
numerous committee.
21 Additional programs targeted at specific groups of beneficiaries are operated by
the Departments of Education, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Veterans
Affairs.
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Table 4. Executive Branch Management of Broad-based Federal Public Assistance
Programs.
Department Agency Program
Health and Human Services Family Support
Administration
.. eal.h .a.e..n ...
Office of Human
Development
kIousing and Urban
Development
Mtfice of Public and
Indian Housing
Services
Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
(AFDC)
Head Start
Social Services
Block Grant
Suppementa .....
Seuiy 40coM.(S9~
Housing Assistance
Payments (Section 8)
internai Kevenue
Service
tamed Income lax
Credit
Source: Coordinating Federal Assistance Programs for the Economically
Disadvantaged: Recommendations and Background Materials 11 (National
Commission for Employment Policy, Special Report No. 31, 1991).
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D. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT SYSTEM OF
SOCIAL WELFARE TRANSFER PROGRAMS AND TAX
EXPENDITURES
The current social welfare system developed largely as the result of
piecemeal social welfare policy making. Consequently, there is little coordination
among the mishmash of social welfare programs and tax expenditures. Four of the
most frequently cited problems resulting from this lack of coordination are that the
current system is inequitable, inefficient, overly complicated, and expensive to
administer. 22 These are discussed in turn.
1. The Current System is Inequitable
The current system often results in inequitable or even capricious
allocations of benefits across families in similar circumstances. In particular, some
families receive multiple benefits, 2 3 while other, similarly-situated families receive
virtually no benefits. Also, programs often work at cross-purposes.
There are also numerous gaps in coverage. For example, even though the
unemployment compensation system covers some 91% of all employed persons, on
average only 42% of unemployed persons were receiving unemployment
22 See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Economist's Lament: Public Assistance in
America, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 57 (1990).
23 Indeed, multiple recipiency is probably the rule. For example, for most food
stamp recipients, food stamps are a second or even a third form of government payment:
fewer than 20% of food stamp households rely solely on nongovernmental sources for their
cash income. Similarly, of the 4.051 million households receiving AFDC in the first quarter
of 1991, 84.6% also received food stamps, and 31.5% also receive public or subsidized
housing. Also, of the 3.593 million households receiving SSI, 44.3% also received food
stamps, 24.9% also received public or subsidized rental housing, and almost all received
Medicaid.
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compensation benefits in 1991. Similarly, while low-income couples with children
are eligible for the earned income credit, low-income childless couples and
individuals are not.
While there are glimmers of coordination in the web of social welfare
programs and tax expenditures, the general approach is disjointed. For example,
food stamps are generally distributed by the same state and local agencies that
distribute AFDC benefits. Consequently, joint applications and interview
procedures for food stamps and AFDC programs are the general rule. On the other
hand, because the SSI program is instead administered by the Social Security
Administration, only limited intake services for food stamps are provided to SSI
recipients. Also, few social welfare programs provide any intake services for the
earned income credit or the dependent care credit.
2. The Current System is Inefficient
One common complaint is that the current system is not well-targeted to
help the needy. In that regard, the overwhelming portion of federal transfer
payments go to people who are decidedly not poor. For example, most Social
Security, Medicare, and dependent care credit benefits go to families who are not
poor.
By the same token, because of arcane eligibility rules many poor families
cannot qualify for means-tested benefits. Moreover, heavy caseloads, arduous
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application procedures, and intense pressure from the federal government to reduce
welfare eligibility error rates have created a virtual obstacle course for the poor so
that many who might qualify are denied benefits because of flawed and incomplete
applications. All in all, only about 60% of the poor participate in the food stamp
program; only about 60% of poor children are covered by AFDC; and only about
60% of the elderly poor participate in SSI. Consequently, many believe that we are
spending hundreds of billions of dollars to buy less poverty reduction than we
could.2 4
Uncoordinated program interactions also frequently result in families
facing cumulative tax rates on earnings in excess of 80 or 90%. Such high
cumulative tax rates pose perverse disincentives for work and for marriage.2 5 For
example, for an AFDC beneficiary trying to leave welfare to work at a minimum
wage job (about $8,500 a year), one study found that the effective tax rate - defined
as the percent of total earnings taken away by decreased welfare benefits, increased
taxes, and additional costs of working - is a confiscatory 93%.26 Indeed, certain
24 See, e.g., Robert Haveman, Starting Even: An Equal Opportunity Program to
Combat the Nation's New Poverty 25 (1988).
25 For recent reviews, see Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the US. Welfare
System: A Review, 30 J. Econ. Literature 1 (1992); and Burtless, supra note 20. See also
Judith M. Gueron, Work and Welfare: Lessons on Employment Programs, 4 J. Econ. Persp.
79(1990).
26 C. Eugene Steuerle & Jason Juffras, Correcting Distortions in the Tax-Transfer
System for Families with Children (Urban Institute Policy Bites No. 6, 1991); see also
Appendix H: Disposible Income, Benefit Levels, and Marriage Penalties for Families with
Children, in Green Book, supra note 6, at 1189-1231.
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beneficiaries can lose more in benefits by working than they can gain in income.
This can occur, for example, when an AFDC recipient ultimately loses both AFDC
and Medicaid coverage as the result of a slight increase in earnings. 2 7
3. The Current System is Overly Complicated
All in all, the current system is an incomprehensible maze of programs.
Public assistance programs, in particular, have baffling eligibility criteria, detailed
documentation requirements, and complex procedures. In that regard, a 1986
report by President Ronald Reagan's Low Income Opportunity Working Group
identified 59 major public assistance programs which were the subject to more than
6,000 pages of Federal laws and regulations, managed by 8 federal departments,
Nor is the problem of high cumulative tax rates confined to the realm of
traditional public assistance programs. For example, consider the situation of elderly
workers. Monthly Social Security retirement (OASI) benefits are paid as a matter of right to
any covered individual who retires at age 62 or older. If such individual continues to work,
however, the individual's Social Security retirement benefits may be reduced by operation of
the social security retirement earnings test. Moreover, an individual who continues to work
must continue to pay Social Security and income taxes on those subsequent earnings, and
may also have to pay income tax on as much as one-half of the individual's Social Security
retirement benefits. Together, the social security retirement earnings test and these tax
provisions combine to subject some beneficiaries to astronomical marginal tax rates on
earned income.
27 The average per capita value of Medicaid insurance coverage in 1990 was
$2,568. Green Book, supra note 6, at 1663. In general, when families lose AFDC eligibility,
categorical Medicaid eligibility also frequently ends. Since April 1, 1990, however, States
are required to extend Medicaid coverage for 12 months to families who leave AFDC due to
earnings. Id. at 626-27.
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and overseen by a score of congressional committees.2 8 State and federal manuals
for these programs can take up a full shelf of office space.
Not surprisingly, coupling this mind-boggling complexity with the poorly-
trained caseworkers in many welfare departments has resulted in high error rates.
This complexity also invariably confuses eligible beneficiaries and leads to low
participation rates. For example, certifying someone for eligibility in the Medicaid
program can take 38 forms.2 9 No wonder many welfare applicants are denied
benefits because of flawed and incomplete applications. Overall, easily 10% of
eligible beneficiaries fail to claim their welfare benefits. 30 In particular, only about
half of homeless families and 15% of homeless individuals receive food stamps, yet
virtually all are eligible.
3 1
4. The Current System Is Expensive to Administer
The current system of overlapping social welfare transfer programs and tax
expenditures administered by more than a dozen federal agencies and more than a
hundred state agencies serving "an assortment of needy groups is not one in which
28 Domestic Policy Council, supra note 1.
29 The Medicaid Backlog: What's Needed is a Change of Attitude About the Poor,
Charlotte (NC) Observer, Mar. 1, 1988, reprinted at 137 Cong. Rec. S15,292, at S15,294-
S15,295 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
30 Hearing Before the Domestic Task Force, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of
Rep. Laurie).
31 Green Book, supra note 6, at 1187. Similarly, a study of food stamp recipiency
in Minnesota found 26,000 eligible Minnesotans unserved out of over 100,000. 137 Cong.
Rec. H5810, H5811 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statement of Rep. Penny).
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administrative efficiency is likely to be prominent." 3 2 Duplicative administrative
costs are incurred at all stages of the process, from determining eligibility to
distributing benefits. Moreover, jurisdictional squabbles often overshadow the
original purpose of delivering services to needy people. All in all, the current
system is expensive to administer. The next Part of this article is devoted to a more
detailed consideration of this problem.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM: WHAT DO
WE KNOW?
Subpart A of this Part of the article provides a brief survey of the
administrative costs associated with various social welfare transfer programs and
with the major tax provisions related to social welfare. Subpart B of this Part then
outlines some key conclusions about administrative costs.
A. A SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
1. Costs of Administering the Social Welfare Transfer Programs
a. Means-tested programs
In general, the administrative structure of most means-tested programs
consumes upwards of 10% or more of the potential benefits. 3 3 For example,
32 Burtless, supra note 20, at 59.
33 Howard J. Karger & David Stoesz, Options in Social Welfare Policy, in
Reconstructing the American Welfare State 132 (David Stoesz & Howard J. Karger eds.,
1992); Haveman, supra note 22, at 136.
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consider the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In fiscal
year 1991, the AFDC program distributed $20.3 billion in benefits to some 4.4
million families (12.6 million people). Federal and state administrative costs
totaled $2.6 billion (roughly 13% of benefits), and the average administrative cost
per family was $592 per year.
Similarly, in 1991 the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
distributed roughly $18.5 billion in benefits to some 5.1 million recipients, and the
cost of administrating the program was about $1.8 billion (roughly 10% of
benefits). 3 4 Also, in fiscal year 1991, some $18.2 billion in food stamp benefits
were paid out, and federal and state administrative expenses came to $2.7 billion
(roughly 15% of benefits).3 5 Administrative costs associated with the Special
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) were even
higher: while the average monthly cost of a WIC food package was $31.67 per
participant, the average monthly per participant administrative cost was $9.74 (31%
of benefits).36
b. Non-means-tested programs
Traditionally, the costs of administering the Social Security retirement
(OASI) and disability (DI) programs are low, comprising between 1 and 2% of
34 Green Book, supra note 6, at 779, 823-24.
35 Green Book, supra note 6, at 1616. Federal administrative expenses were $1.5
billion, and state administrative expenses were some $1.2 billion.
36 Id. at 1687.
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annual benefit payments.3 7 For example, in fiscal year 1991, administrative costs
associated with these programs came to $2.5 billion, roughly 1.0% of benefits
distributed. 3 8 Of note, however, the cost of administering the OASI program was
just .7% of benefits, while the cost of administering the disability program was
2.9% of benefits. Similarly, the costs of administering Medicare in 1991 were about
approximately 2.5% of program outlays. 3
9
2. Costs of Administering the Income Tax
The costs of administering the income tax are low, on the order of 1% of
revenues raised.4 0 Of course, certain tax provisions are more expensive to
administer than others. For example, the complexity of the current earne.] income
credit has made it somewhat of an accounting nightmare: roughly 25% of those
37 See, e.g., Haveman, supra note 22, at 136, and sources cited therein.
38 Green Book, supra note 6, at 83, 135.
39 Id. at 145.
40 Internal Revenue Service: Opportunities to Reduce Taxpayer Burden Through
Return-Free Filing (U.S. General Accounting Office Report No. GGD-92-88BR, 1992). In
that regard, it cost the Internal Revenue Service about $628 million to process the 1991
individual income tax returns. Id. at 37. See also Marsha Blumenthal & Joel Slemrod, The
Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax
Reform, 45 Natl Tax J. 185-202 (1992); Jonathan R. Kesselman, Taxpayer Behavior and the
Design of a Credit Income Tax, in Income-Tested Transfer Programs, supra note 3, at 250;
Haveman, supra note 22, at 136.
On the other hand, the costs borne by citizens in complying with the
income tax are significant, on the order of 6% of revenues raised. Indeed, estimates of the
time and cost it takes U.S. taxpayers to prepare their individual returns are as high as 3
billion hours and $30 billion annually. Internal Revenue Service: Opportunities to Reduce
Taxpayer Burden Through Return-Free Filing, supra at 1. Thus, it costs about $7 in
administrative and compliance costs per $100 of collected income tax revenue.
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eligible for the credit do not file for it, and many of those who do file for it are
technically ineligible. 4 1
B. SOME KEY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
This Subpart sets forth a number of conclusions about the administrative
costs of the social welfare system.
1. Means-Tested Programs Are More Expensive to Administer than Non-
Means-Tested Progams
Eligibility and benefit determinations take time and effort and so relate
directly to program administrative costs. Consequently, multiple and subjective
eligibility criteria, complicated benefit formulae, and detailed verification
requirements can only add to a program's administrative costs. Such complicated
determinations also increase the chance of errors leading to appeals,
reconsiderations, and litigation. All in all, the more complicated a program's
eligibility and benefit determinations are, the higher are its administrative costs.
In that regard, the administrative costs of the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) are relatively low (.7% of benefits) because eligibility is based
upon an applicant's earnings record and work status which are easy to verify and
41 See James R. Storey, The Earned Income Tax Credit: A Growing Form of Aid
to Children Library of Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report No. 91-402 EPW,
1991); Holtzblatt, Janet, Administering Refundable Tax Credits: Lessons from the ETC
Experience, in Nat'l Tax Assn Proc. of the Eighty-Fourth Ann. Conf. 180 (1992); John K.
Scholz, The Participation Rate of the Earned Income Tax Credit (University of Wisconsin
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 928-90, 1990); and see Jonathan B.
Forman, A 'Simpler' Way to Help Children and Low-income Families, 52 Tax Notes 601
(1991).
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benefit computations are straightforward. The administrative costs of the Disability
Insurance (DI) program are a good deal higher (2.9% of benefits), presumably
because the eligibility determinations can also involve physical and mental
examinations and reexaminations, subjective judgments, appeals, and even
litigation.
The administrative costs associated with programs that have means-testing
are even higher, on the order of 10% of benefits. Application forms must be longer
to accommodate questions about income, work, and resources. Caseworkers must
spend more time on the Procrustean tasks of interviewing claimants, verifying the
applications, making eligibility determinations, and computing benefits. Hence,
one can conclude that means-tested programs are generally more expensive to
administer than are non-means-tested programs.
2. Categorical Programs Are More Expensive to Administer than Universal
Progams
Most social welfare programs and tax expenditures have categorical
eligibility requirements; that is, in order to qualify for benefits one must fall within
a narrow category like suitably unemployed (unemployment compensation), totally
disabled (SSI and DI), family with dependent children (AFDC), or taxpayer who
maintains a household for a child under age 13 (dependent care credit). Categorical
programs are popular because they seem to restrict eligibility to those claimants who
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges
are not in a position to provide for themselves - the so-called "worthy" or
"deserving" poor. Unfortunately, like means-testing, categorical testing takes time
and effort and so translates into increased program administrative costs.
Administrative costs will be especially high if a multiplicity of programs is involved
and claimants must make multiple, separate applications before fitting into a benefit
category.4 2
4. Administrative costs are lower in so-called "universal" programs that avoid
such difficult and often subjective categorical eligibility determinations. For
example, since virtually everyone age 65 and over may claim Social Security
(OASI) and Medicare benefits, eligibility determinations are straightforward and
administrative costs are low. The personal exemption deduction is another
example of a universal benefit with relatively low administrative costs. Hence, one
can conclude that categorical programs are generally more expensive to administer
than universal programs.
42 On the other hand, categorization is not necessarily synonymous with a
multiplicity of programs. A single program with universal coverage could divide the
population into categories and subject each category to different eligibility criteria and
benefit structures. The advantages of different treatments could be retained, however, by
avoiding gaps and overlaps in coverage, high administrative costs would be avoided. Irene
Lurie, Integrating Income Maintenance Programs: Problems and Solutions, in Integrating
Income Maintenance Programs, supra note 3, at 1, 16.
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3. Smaller Programs Are Relatively More Expensive to Administer than Larger
Programs
While nobody likes big bureaucracies, it does seem that there are
economies of scale in drafting application forms, manuals, and regulations;
maintaining and keeping records; training staff; and delivering benefits. Empirical
and anecdotal evidence seems to bear this out -- the elephantine Social Security
Administration has relatively lower administrative costs and just seems to be more
efficient than any state welfare department. Accordingly, as a general proposition,
one can conclude that smaller programs are relatively more expensive to administer
than larger programs.
4. More Proprams Means Higher Administrative Costs
Under the current system, dozens of different social welfare transfer
programs and tax expenditures distribute a variety of cash and in-kind benefits to
individuals. It seems likely that duplicative administrative expenses could be
reduced and economies of scale could be realized if benefits were instead distributed
by a few large programs. Consequently, one can conclude that for any given
amount of benefits, the more programs involved in distributing those benefits, the
higher the total administrative costs will be.
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5. In-Kind Benefits Are More Exuensive to Distribute than Cash Benefits
While most social welfare benefits are distributed in the form of cash,
billions of dollars of benefits are distributed in the form of food, housing, or medical
aid. Indeed, over the past 20 years real cash benefits have declined substantially,
while new in-kind benefits (such as food stamps and Medicaid) have increased
dramatically. Economists have complained for years about the efficiency losses
associated with giving people in-kind benefits rather than cash.
43
There are also significant administrative expenses associated with
distributing in-kind benefits. For example, unlike checks, food stamps are
physically handled by over a dozen different entities in the production, printing,
issuance, redemption, clearance, and destruction of the stamps.4 4 In that regard, in
1989 an estimated $367 million in food stamps were diverted from their intended
use as the stamps woand their way through the system, and another $67 million
were lost or stolen.45 Not surprisingly, food stamp program administrative
expenses run about 15% of total benefits. Of note, however, a recent demonstration
project in San Diego found that providing eligible food stamp beneficiaries with
43 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 174-75 (1962).
44 Fin. Management Serv., U.S. Dept of Treasury, Electronic Benefit Transfer: A
Strategy for the Future 2 (1990).
45 Id.
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cash instead of food stamps resulted in significant administrative savings. 46 All in
all, one can conclude that in-kind benefits are more expensive to distribute than
cash benefits.
6. A Complicated System Is More Expensive to Administer than a Simple System
A more complicated social welfare system will result in more paperwork,
increased training of staff, and higher error rates than a simple system.
Consequently, a complicated social welfare system is surely more expensive to
administer than a simple system. Moreover, a simple system has the advantage of
being understandable, both to potential beneficiaries and to the taxpayers who foot
the bill.
7. There Is Often a Trade-Off Between Administrative Costs and Benefit Costs
Because eligibility tests and benefit computations cost money,
administrative costs clearly can be saved by coordinating programs and reducing the
number of eligibility and benefit determinations. On the other hand, to the extent
that coordinating programs increases the number of people eligible for multiple
benefits, total benefit costs will rise. If total benefit costs are, instead, held constant,
then some beneficiaries will see benefit-reductions in order to offset the costs of
46 See, e.g., Food Stamp Program on Its Way Out, San Diego Union, Aug. 28,
1990, at Al, A10.
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covering additional beneficiaries. Hence, there is often a trade-off between
administrative costs and benefit costs.
For example, a recent demonstration project in Illinois found that
integrating food stamps with AFDC through a simplified application process
resulted in administrative savings of $3 million a year.4 7 Unfortunately, benefit
costs increased $19 million a year, primarily because a "hold-harmless" condition of
the demonstration project required that average food stamp benefits remain as high
as they would have been under conventional procedures. Without the hold-harmless
condition, administrative costs could have decreased without the accompanying
increase in total benefit costs, but many beneficiaries would have seen their benefits
reduced.
III. SYNCHRONIZATION: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
This part outlines a number of recent recommendations to synchronize and
coordinate the current system of social welfare transfer programs and tax
expenditures. 4 8
47 Testimony of Joseph F. Delfico, Senior Associate Director, Human Resources
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, in Hearing Before the Domestic Task Force,
supra note 4, at 28-29.
48 See especially National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1. In
Hearing Before the Domestic Task Force, supra note 4, see the testimony and accompanying
materials of Joseph F. Delfico, Senior Associate Director, Human Resources Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office; the testimony of Sandra Gardebring, Minnesota Department of
Human Services on behalf of the National Council of State Human Service Administrators
and the America Public Welfare Association, and Comparison of Food Stamp and AFDC
Program Requirements: with Recommendations for Change (Natl Council of State Human
Serv. Adm'rs 1986), id. at 21, 69, 89; 31; and 102 respectively. See also the minutes of the
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A. SYNCHRONIZE PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Although frequently struggling to achieve similar goals, virtually every
current social welfare program utilizes different criteria to determine eligibility for
benefits. If different programs instead had synchronized eligibility criteria, then
administrative savings could be achieved by having: 1) an applicants financial
situation gathered and recorded in an identical manner for all programs, thereby
reducing the need for multiple forms; 2) a single verification by one program that
should suffice for others; and 3) a centralized determination of financial eligibility
for all programs. 49 In particular, standard definitions of income, resources,
poverty, and eligibility unit are needed. These are discussed in turn.
1. Standardize the Definition of Income
The major means-tested social welfare programs have complicated and
widely differing definitions of income.50 For AFDC eligibility and benefits, all
Meetings of the Welfare Simplification and Coordination Advisory Committee (April 30 and
May 1, 1992; and August 20-22, 1992) (available from the Committee).
49 National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1, at 23. See also S.
1883, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (calling for a joint report by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and the Secretary of Agriculture on eligibility barriers across AFDC,
Medicaid, and Food Stamps), 137 Cong. Rec. S15,292-S15,296 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1991)
(statements of Sens. Hollings, Rockefeller, Thurmond, and Sanford); and National
Commission on Children, Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and
Families (1991) (calling for uniform eligibility criteria across the major federal programs for
pregnant women and children).
50 Moreover, none of those definitions of income matches is used for federal tax
purposes. Of note, gifts and interest on state and local bonds are excluded from gross
income, and a variety of different rules govern the treatment of social welfare benefits:
unemployment compensation benefits are fully taxable; up to one-half of Social Security
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income received by an AFDC family is counted against an eligible family's AFDC
grant unless specifically excluded. Unearned income like gifts, tax-exempt interest,
and child support payments in excess of $50 per month are counted. On the other
hand, the first $90 per month of earned income is disregarded (standard work
expense deduction); another $30 of earned income is disregarded for the first 12
months after starting work; one-third of the rest is disregarded for the first four
months after starting work; and reasonable employment-related child care expenses
are also disregarded.
SSI eligibility and benefits are based upon countable income. The first $20
of monthly income from virtually any source is excluded from countable income. In
addition, the first $65 of earned income plus one-half of remaining earnings are
excluded, and the work expenses of certain recipients are disregarded. The value of
certain in-kind assistance is counted as income.
Food stamp eligibility and benefits are generally based on "counted
monthly income." First, a household determines its basic monthly income as all of
the household's cash income less a variety of arcane exclusions. Counted monthly
benefits may be taxable; and welfare benefits and worker's compensation benefits are
generally not taxable. Also, unlike most social welfare programs which use monthly
accounting, federal income taxes are based on an annual accounting period. See generally
William A. Klein,The Definition of"Income" Under a Negative Income Tax, 2 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 449 (1974); William D. Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax, 78 Yale L.J.
388 (1969).
Adding to the complexity of federal taxation, Social Security taxes are
generally based on compensation (i.e., wages and self-employment income), rather than
income.
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income generally equals basic monthly income less a standard deduction ($122 a
month in fiscal year 1992), 20% of any earned income (in recognition of taxes and
work expenses), and up to $160 a month per dependent for employment-related
child care expenses. Adding to the complexity, different rules apply for households
without an elderly or disabled member than for those with one.
Social Security benefits are not means-tested with respect to income;
however, the so-called earnings tests reduce benefits of recipients who have "earned
income" after initial eligibility. For example, in 1992 retired beneficiaries ages 62
through 64 lose $1 in OASI benefits for each $2 of earned income over $7,440 per
year, retired beneficiaries ages 65 through 69 lose $1 in OASI benefits for each $3
of earned income over $10,200 per year. Also, up to one-half of Social Security
benefits are subject to federal income taxation for individuals with incomes over
$25,000 and couples with incomes over $32,000.
Ideally, different programs should have the same definition of income. At
the very least, different programs should coordinate their treatment of particular
income items such as: student grants, scholarships, and loans; child support; work
expenses (including child care); training allowances; lump sum payments; earned
income of minors in school; self-employment income; and income from state-
funded complementary programs.
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2. ' andardize the Definition of Resources
Different means-tested social welfare programs also have widely differing
definitions of resources. For example, AFDC eligibility is restricted to qualified
persons with less than $1,000 of countable resources per family not counting the
home; basic items essential to day-to-day living, such as clothing and furniture; an
automobile (with an equity limit of up to $1,500); and certain burial plots for the
individual and immediate family.
On the other hand, SSI eligibility is restricted to qualified persons with less
than $2,000 of countable resources ($3,000 for married couples). Countable
resources do not include the individual's home, and, within reasonable limits certain
household goods, personal effects, an automobile (with a value of up to $4,500), and
burial plots.
Moreover, food stamp households must generally have counted "liquid"
assets that do not exceed $2,000 ($3,000 for households with an elderly member).
Counted liquid assets include cash, savings, stocks and bonds, certain retirement
funds, and the equity in an automobile in excess of $4,500.
Ideally, different programs should have the same definition of resources.
At the very least, different programs should coordinate their treatment of various
assets such as vehicles and life insurance. Different programs should also
coordinate their resource limits and transfer-of-asset policies.
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3. Utilize a Standard Poverty Income Level
a. Poverty income measures
Different social welfare programs also use widely differing poverty income
measures to determine eligibility for benefits. Perhaps the best known is the
Department of Health and Human Services' poverty income guidelines. 5 1 The 1992
poverty income guidelines for all states (except Alaska and Hawaii) and the District
of Columbia are as follows:
Size of family unit Poverty income guideline These poverty income
IJ ......2 9,190 guidelines are used as eligibility
4 13,950 criteria by a number of social
6 18,710
.... ..... welfare programs. Unfortunately,
8 23,470
ore than 8 memrs, $2,380 many social welfare programs useFor family units with more than 8 membr,$,0
is added for each additional member. alternative measures to determine
eligibility for benefits. For
example, the Low Income Opportunity Group's 1986 study of 59 social welfare
programs found that 27 of the programs used the applicable poverty income
guideline or a percentage multiple of the guidelines to determine eligibility;
however, the remaining programs used alternative poverty income measures such as
the median income of a state or county, a state-determined eligibility level, or still
other measures. 5 2
51 See, e.g., Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dept of Health and Human Serv.,
Annual Update of the Poverty Income Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 5455 (1992). The poverty
income guidelines are a simplified version of the federal governments statistical poverty
thresholds used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, to prepare
statistical estimates of the number of persons and families in poverty.
52 National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1, at 22, citing
Domestic Policy Council, supra note 1.
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The federal income tax system, too, uses still other "poverty" measures to
determine entry-level liability for the income tax, the earned income credit amount,
and the dependent care credit amount. For example, in 1992, a family of four
consisting of a husband and wife filing a joint tax return and two dependent
children would be entitled to a $6,000 standard deduction and four $2,300 personal
exemptions. Consequently, the family would not have to pay any income tax until it
had gross income in excess of a $15,200 "income tax threshold." On the other
hand, an eligible family's earned income credit would begin to phase out once it had
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, earned income) in excess of $11,413, and an
eligible family's dependent care credit would begin to decrease once it had adjusted
gross income in excess of $10,000.
A standard measure of poverty for all programs would be a significant step
forward. 53 The Department of Health and Human Services' poverty income
guidelines may be the appropriate measure for that job. On the other hand, it might
make more sense to come up with a poverty measure that takes into account
regional differences in the United States. Of note, the Lower Living Standard
Income Level (LLSIL) used by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) is an
existing poverty measures that does take regional differences into account. More
53 The Joint Economic Committee held an as yet unpublished hearing on this
issue in 1990.
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generally, some have suggested setting the poverty line at 40% of median family
income for each region, and adjusting social welfare benefits accordingly.54
b. Poverty income eligibility levels
Even if different programs use the same poverty income measure to
determine eligibility, different programs frequently use different poverty income
levels to determine eligibility. For example, AFDC and Medicaid recipients must
generally have incomes that are below 185% of the Department of Health and
Human Services' poverty income guidelines, but food stamp recipients must
generally have incomes below 130% of those guidelines.
Recently, many programs have tried to simplify this eligibility
determination by using categorical eligibility standards. For example, households
in which all members receive benefits from AFDC or SSI are categorically eligible
for food stamps. Categorical eligibility has helped reduce eligibility testing, but
multiple testing is still a problem. In that regard, it would make more sense for
different programs to all use the same poverty income level.
4. Standardize the Eliibility Unit Rules
Different programs also have widely differing eligibility unit rules. AFDC
uses a "family" definition, that generally includes only dependent children, their
siblings, and their parents or other caretakers. On the other hand, the definition of
54 Karger & Stoesz, supra note 31, at 135-39.
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"household" eligible for food stamps generally encompasses all household members
that prepare and eat meals together. Federal income taxes are, instead, collected
from such filing units as married couples filing jointly and surviving spouses, heads
of households, unmarried individuals, and married individuals filing separately. 5 5
Adding to the complexity, Social Security taxes are collected from individual
workers in covered employment or self-employment, but Social Security benefits are
paid to those workers, their dependents, and their survivors, as these terms are
uniquely defined in the Social Security Act.
Ideally, different programs should use the same eligibility unit rules. At
the very least, it would make sense if different programs used the same definitions
for such critical terms as dependent, spouse, and survivor.
5. Related Recommendations
Different social welfare programs should also standardize other eligibility
factors, definitions, and terminology. 5 6 For example, different programs should
strive to have the same policies towards aliens and strikers. Also, different
55 Moreover, within the income tax, still other eligibility unit rules can apply. For
example, to claim the dependent care credit, taxpayers must generally maintain a household
which includes a child under age 13. On the other hand, to claim the basic earned income
credit, most any child under age 19 will do; while, only children under age 1 count for the
supplemental young child earned income credit.
56 To help facilitate the synchronization process, the National Commission for
Employment Policy recommended that the federal government provide grants to enable states
to modernize their assistance programs through the development of expert-systems eligibility
software for program coordination.
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programs should have the same work registration exemptions and the same
disqualification periods and good cause rules.
B. SYNCHRONIZE PROGRAM BENEFIT STRUCTURES
Unfortunately, uniform eligibility criteria and procedures would only solve
about half of the coordination problem because each program also has its own
unique benefit computation mechanism. Thus, even if a beneficiary of one program
is categorically eligible for participation in a second program, the second program
must make its own separate benefit computation based on its own different
criteria. 57
There are a variety of mechanisms for coordinating the benefits received
under multiple transfer programs. 5 8 For example, under full benefit offset, each
dollar of benefits from one program reduces the benefits to be received from the
second program by one dollar. An alternative coordination mechanism is to simply
prohibit recipients from collecting benefits from more than one program at a time.
Still another alternative is to sequence benefits so that an increase in a recipient's
income first phases out the benefits under one program and only then begins to
phase out the benefits from a second program. The choice of which
57 For example, if a household consists entirely of members who are eligible for
AFDC, the household is categorically eligible for food stamps. Nevertheless, separate
benefit computations are needed for the two programs.
58 See especially Thad W. Mirer, Alternative Approaches to Integrating Transfer
Programs, in Integrating Income Maintenance Programs, supra note 3, at 147.
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coordination mechanism should be used to connect different programs depends on a
variety of factors. Whatever mechanism is chosen, however, one goal must be to try
to avoid high cumulative tax rates which can discourage work or marriage.
Simplicity, equity, and efficiency are also be important considerations. 5 9
C. COORDINATE PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS
1. Consolidate Programs with Similar Objectives
Some of the greatest gains can come from consolidating programs with
similar missions. 6 0 Combining such programs can reduce duplication, improve
program management and administration, and reduce administrative costs.6 1 In
that spirit, for example, the National Commission for Employment Policy recently
recommended that the Department of Agriculture's Food Stamps Employment and
Training program, the Department of Labor's Job Training Partnership Act
program, the Department of Health and Human Services' Job Opportunities and
59 In that regard, it is hard to imagine achieving simplicity as long as there are a
multiplicity of different programs involved. For example, as of January 1, 1991, the amount
of a beneficiary's earned income credit generally may not to be taken into account as income
or as a resource for determining the eligibility or amount of benefits for AFDC, Medicaid,
SSI, food stamps, or low-income housing programs; yet even this rather straightforward rule
is subject to a variety of qualifications and exceptions. Thus, even when different programs
are expressly synchronized, it is difficult to avoid complexity.
60 In that regard, some consolidations can be brought about under the Presidents
reorganization authority, but most programs are based in statute and so require congressional
action.
61 For example, a reorganization in the 1980's consolidated six programs that
directly assisted families (AFDC, Child Support Enforcement (CSE), Community Services
Block Grants, Low-Income Home Energy Assistance; the Work Incentive Program for AFDC,
and Refugee Settlement) into the Department of Health and Human Services' Family Support
Administration.
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Basic Skills (JOBS) program, and other relevant job training programs be
consolidated into one agency.6 2 Proposals calling for an Administrative Law Judge
Corps are similar in approach. 6 3 On a broader scale, it might make sense to
combine AFDC and Food Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, or Social Security and
SSI.
2. Coordinate Operations of Serte Progranms
Where consolidating different programs is not possible, it would-make
sense to at least coordinate the operations of different programs. In that regard, a
study by the General Accounting Office found substantial integration at the state
level among AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, and the state-run Emergency
Assistance to Needy Families with Children programs.6 4 This section discusses
some of the coordination approaches that have worked so far.
62 National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1, at viii. The
Commission also recommended that the President expand the authority of the Economic
Empowernent Task Force (EETF), the successor to the Low Income Opportunity Working
Group, to resolve problems that affect the design and implementation of federal public
assistance programs. Specifically, the Commission recommended that an expanded EETF
should be authorized to systematically review and coordinate all public assistance programs;
to grant broad waivers from Federal rules that establish State procedures for implementing
public assistance programs; and to develop mechanisms to track and share information about
the outcomes of state-level public assistance innovations. Id. at vii.
63 See, e.g., Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1990).
64 LIHEAP energy assistance and Section 8 housing assistance were integrated
only to a lesser extent. Hearing Before the Domestic Task Force, supra note 22, at 22
(testimony of Joseph F. Delfico, Senior Associate Director, Human Resources Division, U.S.
General Accounting Office), citing Needs-Based Programs, supra note 1.
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a. Collocation of services
To receive benefits under more than one program (and most families do), a
family may have to go to different agencies in its home county, meet different
eligibility standards, and abide by different and often conflicting rules and
regulations. The states have made great strides in recent years to develop one-
stopping and one-stop eligibility determination for services needed by families and
individuals. Indeed, at the state level AFDC and food stamps are almost always
housed in the same operation, and the same persons do the eligibility determination.
Still, because some programs are federally-administered (i& Social
Security) while others are state-administered (i&, food stamps) and because there
are just so many different programs, one-stop shopping cannot become the rule
without a number of statutory program changes.
b. Coanplication and coeligibility determination
Ideally, different programs should have the same application requirements
and procedures. A single multi-purpose application form could provide an
applicant with the opportunity to record sufficient data on one form to permit the
determination of his or her eligibility for several programs. Together with joint
processing of applications, such multi-purposes applications could make it easier for
individuals to access services. This approach can lead to shorter application time,
less paperwork, and reduced administrative costs.
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c. Integrated case management
Ideally, each beneficiary should deal with a single case manager. Such
integrated case management can reduce administrative caseloads and error rates
and improve services to beneficiaries.
d. Integmated pavme n stems
Coordinating the delivery of benefits from multiple programs into a single
monthly payment can also result in significant administrative savings. In that
regard, both federal and state governments are experimenting with streamlining the
delivery of welfare benefits by using electronic benefits transfers (EBT) rather than
food stamps and welfare checks. 6 5 EBT systems issue and redeem benefits through
the use of electronic funds transfers using automated teller machines (ATMs) and
point-of-sale (POS) terminals. 6 6
For example, in a typical food stamp program application, a recipient's
monthly benefits are posted to a computer file, and the recipient is issued a plastic
EBT access card (like a commercial credit card or an ATM debit card).6 7 To buy
65 See generally Fin. Management Serv., Dept of Treasury, supra note 42; Office
of Analysis and Evaluation, Food and Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dept of Agriculture, Electronic
Benefit Transfer in the Food Stamp Program: The First Decade (1992).
66 In many ways EBT systems operate like direct deposit arrangements for
beneficiaries with bank accounts. Ultimately, EBT systems should be able to provide similar
services and protections for the 28 million benefit recipients who do not have bank accounts
and who currently pay as much as S25 just to cash a single benefit check.
67 Indeed, EBT systems can be integrated into existing commercial credit and
debit card ATM and POS systems.
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groceries, the recipient uses the EBT card with a secret personal identification
number (PIN) at special check-out counter terminals in each store which obtain
authorization from the EBT computer system. The dollar value is electronically
subtracted from the recipient's benefit balance and credited to the store's bank
account.
While still in the experimental stages, EBT shows promise of reducing
administrative costs and recipient fraud.6 8 Recipients benefit from the increased
convenience, elimination of check cashing fees, speedy replacement of lost or stolen
funds, and elimination of the stigma attached to using food stamp coupons.
Retailers and banks with EBT experience are also enthusiastic about savings and
convenience. All in all, even greater savings and convenience should result from
combining food stamps, AFDC, SSI, general assistance, and other social welfare
benefits into a single, integrated EBT payment system.
3. Standardize Administrative Procedures
Ideally, different programs should have the same procedures for
conducting so-called "fair hearings" and appeals; the same verification
requirements at application, recertification, and redetermination; the same
verifications associated with monthly reporting; the same recipient notice
68 For example, it costs the federal government $0.30 to issue a check compared
to $0.04 for electronic payments. Similarly, it cost one Eastern state about $2.50 to print and
mail every benefit check. Moreover, EBT systems can reduce welfare check and food stamp
coupon losses, diversions, and thefts. All in all, hundreds of millions of dollars could be
saved if all state and federal benefits could be routed electronically and accessed by each
recipient using a single plastic card for all of his or her benefits.
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requirements; the same recertification and redetermination requirements; and the
same quality control program. Also, different programs should coordinate various
planning and operating timetables, performance and quality control measures, and
operating procedures for processing clients and for contracting.
4. Standardize Reporting Reouirements
Ideally, different programs should have the same monthly reporting
requirements, the same change of circumstance reporting requirements, and the
same kinds of penalties for failure to report earned income.
D. CONSOLIDATE SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FORMULATION
1. Policy Coordination in the Executive Branch
The sheer number of Executive Branch agencies involved in administering
social welfare transfer programs and tax expenditures makes policy coordination
extremely difficult.6 9 It would make sense to coordinate social welfare policy
formulation in a single agency. The Office of Management and Budget, the
President's Economic Empowerment Task Force (successor to, the Low Income
Opportunity Working Group), or the Department of Health and Human Services are
likely candidates.
69 This same problem occurs at the state level; however, while most states have
integrated the operations of various social welfare programs, only a few have tried to
coordinate social welfare policy making.
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On a lesser scale, there have been occasional interagency agreements,
interagency work groups, and coordinated regulation-writing. 70 Unfortunately,
most of the major differences between programs are rooted in statute. What is
needed is a key Executive Branch voice calling for synchronizing legislation.7 1
2. Policy Coordination in Congess
Similarly, many analysts have recommended that Congress assign
responsibility for legislation and oversight of all public assistance programs to a
single Committee on Public Assistance in both the House and the Senate. 7 2 These
committees should have the responsibility for legislation and oversight over all food
and nutrition, job training, housing, health, and income security programs targeted
at low-income families. Also, these committees should work with the Executive
Branch agencies to streamline eligibility requirements, formulate standard
definitions and poverty measures, and ease administrative and documentation
requirements. 7 3
70 See, e.g., Food and Nutrition Serv., Dept of Agriculture & Family Support
Admin., Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Consistency for Food Stamp Program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program and Adult Assistance Program, 52 Fed.
Reg. 36,546 (Sept. 29, 1987).
71 In that regard, neither the National Commission for Employment Policy nor the
Welfare Simplification and Coordination Advisory Committee will have sufficient political
clout to secure such legislation.
72 See, e.g., National Commission for Employment Policy, supra note 1, at xi.
73 The National Commission for Employment Policy also suggested that these
public assistance committees should enact legislation to establish human resource councils at
the state level to foster coordinated program approached in such key functions as planning,
operations, and oversight and they should require that an economic, fiscal, and institutional
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3. Consider Programs as an Integrated Whole
The current social welfare system "is composed of perhaps a dozen
quantitatively important programs, and another 200 or so minor programs that
interact and overlap in ways so bewildering that no one has ever been able to put
together a coherent overview the whole system."7 4 Accordingly, it would make
sense for the federal government to develop schedules that show how all the current
social welfare programs and tax provisions intereact. 7 5 These schedules would be
an extremely useful source of information for policynakers. For example, efforts
could then be made to eliminate high cumulative tax rates that result when multiple
programs interact in an uncoordinated way. Similarly, efforts could be made to fill
in the gaps in coverage left by the current mishmash of programs.
E. COORDINATE PROGRAM FINANCING METHODS
Different programs also have a variety of differing financing mechanisms.
Some programs are financed entirely by the federal government (g,&, SSI), while
analysis be conducted for each congressionally authored institutional reform or adjustment in
federal assistance programs. Id.
74 Edgar K. Browning, Commentaries [on papers in a section entitled, Where Do
We Go From Here?], in Income Redistribution, supra note 3,207-10, at 208.
75 This suggestion comes from, inter alia, Eugene Steuerle, Uses of the NIT
Framework, Focus (a Newsletter of the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on
Poverty, Madison, Wis.), Spring 1990, at 30. For an example of such a schedule, see Lewis
& Morrison, supra note 3. Also, the Green Book has begun to develop such schedules with
its new Appendix H - Disposible Income, Benefit Levels, and Marriage Penalties for
Families with Children. Green Book, supra note 6, 1189-1231.
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others are jointly financed with the states ( Medicaid). Also, some programs
are financed with earmarked taxes held in trust funds (r,& Social Security), while
others are simply financed out of general revenues (rg, SSI). It might make sense
to develop a single financing mechanism for all the social welfare transfer
programs. For example, the income and payroll taxes could be integrated into a
single comprehensive income tax.7 6
IV. BEYOND SYNCHRONIZATION: WHY NOT TOTAL INTEGRATION?
Unfortunately, as long as we follow a piecemeal approach to social welfare
reform of "trying to patch up each one of the innumerable and uncountable
programs, we are unlikely to move towards any obviously more sensible type of
transfer system."7 7 What is needed is a comprehensive approach to social welfare
reform. In that regard, after looking at the current social welfare system
comprehensively, many analysts have come to the conclusion that social welfare
reform should proceed by integrating as many social welfare transfer programs and
tax provisions as possible into a single rational and unified program. Such an
integrated social welfare program would achieve significant administrative savings
76 For a discussion of some total and partial integration alternatives, see, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Fornan, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement Program:
Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-earner Couples, 45 Tax Lawyer 915 (1992).
77 Browning, supra note 72, at 209.
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by eliminating much of the complexity and duplication in the current social welfare
system. 7 8 This Part of the article discusses two approaches to integration.
A. THE TEXTBOOK APPROACH - A NEGATIVE INCOME TAX
The classic way to integrate social welfare transfer programs and tax
expenditures is to replace them all with a negative income tax.7 9 Basically, a
negative income tax is a system of cash transfers to families in which the amount of
a family's cash transfer varies inversely with its income: the lower a family's
pretransfer income, the greater the amount of the government's net transfer to it. 8 0
78 An income transfer program is a system that provides cash benefits to the poor.
An income transfer program can be said to be "comprehensive" if it replaces or incorporates
other programs.
79 See, e.g., Robert J. Lampman, Approaches to the Reduction of Poverty, 55 Am.
Econ. Rev. 521 (1965); Christopher Green, & Robert J. Lampman, Schemes for Transferring
Income to the Poor, 6 Indus. Rel. 121 (1967); James Tobin et al., Is a Negative Income Tax
Practical?, 77 Yale L. J. 1 (1967); Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute, 78 Yale
L. J. 269 (1968).
80 Generally, two policy variables can define a simple negative income tax. The
target or breakeven income level is the income level at which a family becomes ineligible for
benefits and the government subsidy equals zero. The benefit-reduction rate (sometimes
called the marginal tax rate) determines the rate of reduction of a family's subsidy as the
family's pretransfer income increases. In a simple negative income tax, the family's subsidy
is the product of the benefit-reduction rate and the excess of the breakeven income level over
the family's pretransfer income. The maximum subsidy (sometimes called the guarantee) is
received by a family with no other income. A household's net (i.e., posttransfer) income for
the year is the sum of its actual income plus the amount of the subsidy it receives.
In some ways, the present food stamp program operates like a negative
income tax, since food stamp benefits go down as income goes up, but benefits are in the
form of food stamps, not cash. President Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan was also a
form of negative income tax. Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, Pub. Papers 637
(Aug. 8, 1969); see also Special Message to Congress on Welfare Reform, Pub. Papers 647
(Aug. 11, 1969).
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For example, a negative income tax could be designed to guarantee every
family an income at least equal to its poverty income guideline. Table 5 illustrates
how such a negative income tax would work for a family of four (1992 poverty
income guideline roughly equal to $14,000). Setting the break-even level at
$28,000 and using a 50 percent benefit-reduction rate would result in a maximum
subsidy of $14,000 for families with no other income. Families with higher
pretransfer incomes would receive smaller subsidies.
Table 5. A Negative Income Tax (NIT) for a Family of Four
(1992 poverty income guideline equals roughly $14,000)
PRETRANSFER INCOME NIT SUBSIDY NET ANNUAL INCOME
4,000 12,000 16,000
12,000 8,000 20,000
,,,,...... i ii~i~iiiiiii ~ iii iiiiii~ ii i~ i ~ ii~ i ii~iiiiiiiiiii}............ .. ... }} ~ i
20,000 4,000 24,000
28,000 0 28,000
Replacing the current social welfare system with a negative income tax
would decrease administrative costs by reducing program complexity and
duplication. 8 1 Unfortunately, a negative income tax would still have the significant
administrative costs associated with means-testing. Consequently, although the
administrative costs for a negative income tax would be lower than those of the.
current social welfare system, they would still be fairly high, with estimates ranging
from 3 to 10% of benefits distributed.8 2
81 In addition, a negative income tax would be more efficient than the current
system and would result in greater equity in the distribution of benefits than the current
system.
82 See, e.g., Kesselman, supra note 38, at 254. Estimates varied depending upon
such factors as the complexity of the negative income tax and the number of households
covered.
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On the other hand, benefit costs would unequivocally increase if such a
generous negative income tax were adopted. A generous negative income tax would
surely cover more beneficiaries and so have greater total benefit costs than the
current social welfare system. For that matter, even a negative income tax that
provided somewhat less generous benefits to beneficiaries of the current social
welfare system could nevertheless have greater total benefit costs than the current
social welfare system, depending upon the number and amount of benefits provided
to additional beneficiaries.
Even more troubling, many of the additional beneficiaries brought in by a
negative income tax would be people that the public generally expects to work;
whereas, any offsetting benefit-reductions would likely be faced by those most in
need of public assistance. For all of its faults, the current categorical system at least
tries to differentiate between those who are expected to work (able-bodied
individuals) and those who are not (the elderly, the disabled, children, and, perhaps,
mothers with small children). This distinction between those who are expected to
work and those who are not is an important one, rooted in basic American values
toward labor force participation.8 3
Worse still, a generous negative income tax could discourage work by
those able-bodied individuals expected to work. All means-tested welfare programs
83 Cf., Gueron, supra note 23.
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discourage work, since the more you work, the less benefits you get. Because a
negative income tax extends means-tested welfare benefits to more people, it
multiplies those work disincentives. Moreover, the high-benefit reduction rates
needed to keep the total benefit costs of a negative income tax under control only
magnify the problem of work disincentives. Again, for all of its faults, the current
categorical system at least tries to restrict generous means-tested welfare benefits to
those who are not expected to work and thereby concentrates the adverse work
incentives on the population least likely to be affected by them.
84
With all of these problems, it is hardly surprising that negative income
taxes have not been given serious political consideration for years.
8 5
B. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE THAT PROMOTES SELF-SUFFICIENCY
In this Subpart the author outlines a proposal that would combine most
social welfare transfer programs and tax expenditures into a rational, integrated
system of refundable tax credits and related programs. The general idea is to
replace as much of the current social welfare system as possible with a unified
system of refundable tax credits.
Two types of tax credits would be provided. First, refundable per capita
tax credits of, say, $1,200 per year would provide a minimal safety net. Second,
84 Burtless, supra note 20, at 65.
85 According to economist Gary Burtless, "it is safe to say that the negative
income tax has had only one major constituency - economists." Burtless, supra note 20, at
64.
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additional refundable tax credits would be available to certain individuals based
upon determinations of employability and need made by a single agency at the local
level. In addition, a comprehensive federal health plan would ensure that nobody
would lose health coverage by working. Finally, education, training, and other
services would be provided at the local level through a single agency.
1. A Comprehensive System of Refundable Tax Credits
The idea of replacing most of the social welfare system with a
comprehensive system of refundable tax credits is not a new one, but it has not been
given serious consideration for at least 20 years.86 The phenomenal growth of the
social welfare system in that time has only exacerbated the system's problems to the
point where it is simply out of control. A comprehensive system of tax credits
would avoid most of those problems, so it makes sense to reconsider replacing the
current social welfare system with tax credits.
a. Refundable per capita tax credits would provide a minimal safety net
86 See e.g., Harvey E. Brazer, The Federal Income Tax and the Poor, 57 Cal. L.
Rev. 422 (1969); Sheldon S. Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117
U. Pa. L. Rev. 678 (1969); Donald J. Curran, Taxation and the Relief of Poverty, 25 Rev.
Soc. Econ. 107 (1967); Earl R. Rolph, The Case for a Negative Income Tax Device, 6 Indus.
Rel. 155 (1967); Stanley S. Surrey, Income Maintenance Programs, 24 Tax L. Rev. 305
(1969).
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At the core of the author's proposed system of refundable tax credits would
be a universal demogrant, integrated with the income and payroll taxes.8 7
Basically, a demogrant is a cash transfer paid to every individual without regard to
income-level. At the outset, these demogrants should take the form of refundable
per capita tax credits of, say, $1,200 a year.
Individuals would claim these per capita tax credits annually by filing an
income tax return. Alternatively, individuals could elect to receive monthly
distribution of these tax credits through reduced withholding, direct deposit,
electronic benefits transfer, or through a local social welfare agency. 8 8 Thus, these
per capita tax credits would provide a minimal safety net: a family of four who had
nothing else could get $400 per month from the government.
This country has been trying for years to avoid the costs of a universal
demogrant by restricting most transfer payments to individuals who are not
expected to work. 8 9 Unfortunately, the current categorical social welfare system
has run into the formidable problems of inequity, inefficiency, complexity, and high
administrative expense. Demogrants could avoid these problems.
87 See e.g., Benjamin A. Okner, The Role of Demogrants as an Income
Maintenance Alternative, in Integrating Income Maintenance Programs, supra note 3, at 79,
James Tobin, Considerations Regarding Taxation and Equity, in Income Redistribution,
supra note 3, at 127-33.
88 Alternatively the Social Security Administration to distribute benefits. It
already deals with poor SSI recipients, and its offices are more decentralized than those of
the Internal Revenue Service. Cf., Popkin, supra note 48, at 428-29.
89 This point was made by James Tobin decades ago, and it seems even more true
now. Cf., Tobin, supra note 85, at 133. See also Gueron, supra note 23.
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First, demogrants would be inherently fair in that they would be
universally available. Second, demogrants would be efficient. In particular,
working would not subject individuals to the high cumulative tax rates of current
means-tested programs, and the relatively low-level demogrant proposed here would
leave individuals with virtually every incentive to work to supplement their
incomes. 9 0 Third, demogrants would be simple to understand and distribute.
Finally, demogrants would result in tremendous administrative savings as they
would not require means-testing and they would replace numerous overlapping and
duplicative programs.
While it would be premature to say that a consensus is forming in favor of
demogrants, a number of recent welfare reform proposals have incorporated similar
or even more generous demogrants as key components. For example, Professor
Robert Haveman proposed a demogrant to ensure that every family had income of at
least one-half to two-thirds of the poverty income guideline. 9 1 Also, Professor
90 In that regard, the author believes that the generosity of former Senator George
S. McGovem's demogrant proposal cut against the grain of the American work ethic and so
hurt his already beleaguered 1972 Presidential campaign. Under McGovern's proposal, every
American would have been given $1,000 a year from the federal government - a lot of
money in 1972. The demogrants would have been taxable income, and higher proposed tax
rates would have recovered much of the benefits provided to those with moderate and high
incomes. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. 11,799-801 (1972Xstatement of Sen. McGovern).
91 Haveman, supra note 22, at 149-71. The other principal components of
Haveman's reform proposal are: a standard benefit retirement program, along with tax-
favored annuities; a universal child support system; employment subsidies for disadvantaged
workers (both an employer-based tax credit for hiring disadvantaged workers and an
employee-based wage subsidy credit focused on the disadvantaged workers; and a universal
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Sheldon Danziger recently suggested replacing personal exemptions with a per
capita refundable tax credit.9 2 Along similar lines, the National Commission on
Children recently proposed a $1,000 refundable tax credit for every child.9 3
b. Additional tax credits tied to emuloyability
Per capita tax credits alone cannot meet all of the important goals set for
the nation's social welfare system. Consequently, additional refundable tax credits
would be needed. In that regard, the current earned income credit should be
personal capital account for youths [Upon turning 18, each person could draw up to $20,000
for approved purchases of education and training]).
Also, Professors Howard J. Karger and David Stoesz would use cash
assistance to ensure that most families would end up with income greater than or equal to
40% of the median family income in each region. Karger & Stoesz, supra note 31, at 119.
Basically, Karger and Stoesz would collapse AFDC, SSI, the earned income tax credit, and
the income support components of all other social welfare programs (including Food Stamps,
WIC, LIHEAP, and Section 8) into a single income-maintenance program - the Stable
Incomes Program-which would be under one administrative unit. Each beneficiary would
receive a single benefit package developed with the assistance of a case manager. Money
would go from the Internal Revenue Service to the appropriate welfare agency and on to the
beneficiary. Id. at 140.
92 Sheldon Danziger, Tax Reform, Poverty and Inequality (University of
Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 829-87, 1987) (His
proposal would also make the dependent care credit refundable.). See also Irwin Garfinkel
& Robert Haveman, Income Transfer Policy in the United States, Handbook of Social
Intervention 479 (Edward Seidman ed., 1983) (replace personal exemption deductions and
Food Stamps with a per capita refundable tax credit); Robert I Lerman, Separating Income
Support from Income Supplementation, 10 J. Inst. for Socio-economic Studies 101 (1985)
(replace personal exemption deduction with a $600 refundable tax credit).
93 National Commission on Children, supra note 47. See also C. Eugene Steuerle
& Jason Juffras, A $1,000 Tax Credit for Every Child: A Base of Reform for the National's
Tax, Welfare, and Health Systems (Urban Institute Changing Domestic Priorities Policy
Paper 1991); Jonathan B. Forman, A Modest Proposal for Refundable Children's Allowance
Tax Credits, 47 Tax Notes 853 (1990).
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retained as an earnings supplement for low-income workers,94 and the current
dependent care credit should be expanded and made refundable so that it also helps
low-income families with children. 95
In addition, new credits should be developed in lieu of the important social
welfare programs that should be merged into the comprehensive system of tax
credits. For example, eligible elderly and totally disabled individuals should receive
new supplemental tax credits for the elderly and disabled instead of SSI benefits.
Similarly, low-income families with young children should receive children's
allowance tax credits instead of AFDC benefits.9 6 Still more tax credits would be
needed to bring unemployment compensation and possibly workers' compensation
benefits into the system.
94 The current earned income credit should be modified in several ways. First,
the supplemental earned income credit for families with two or more children would be
stripped out and included as its purpose would be served by the per capita tax credit.
Second, the supplemental health care earned income credit would be stripped out and
integrated with a comprehensive federal health plan. Third, the supplemental young child
earned income credit would be stripped out and added to a children's allowance tax credit.
Finally, some thought should be given to restructuring the credit as a more efficient wage
subsidy credit rather than an earnings subsidy credit. See Jonathan B. Forman, Improving
the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor, 16
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41 (1988); and see also Haveman, supra note 22, at 165-68 (suggestingboth an employer-based tax credit for hiring disadvantaged workers and a wage subsidy
credit for those workers).
95 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit
Proposal: Towards a Comprehensive System of Tax Credits to Help Low-income Families
with Children, 38 Emory L. J. 661 (1989).
96 See sources cited in note 91, supra.
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Eligibility for many of these additional credits should be tied to a
determination of employability made by a single caseworker in a local social welfare
agency. 9 7 Caseworkers would classify beneficiaries into a variety of employability
categories and subcategories and develop a coherent tax credit program for them.
Employability categories should include: 1) the elderly; 2) the totally disabled; 3)
the partially disabled;9 8 4) single parents with young children; 5) and unemployed
individuals.
The local social welfare agency would notify the Internal Revenue Service
of its employability determination and tax credit determinations, and the additional
credits would be distributed to eligible beneficiaries along with their per capita tax
credits. Consequently, instead of receiving multiple benefits from multiple different
sources, every eligible beneficiary could receive a single monthly payment of all
appropriate tax credits.
Incorporating categorical credits into the system of refundable tax credits
would increase administrative costs because of the need to assess an individual's
eligibility. On the whole, however, a comprehensive system of refundable tax
credits would eliminate the duplicative administrative expenses in the current social
welfare system and so result in significant cost savings: a comprehensive system of
97 The approach presented here is somewhat similar to that suggested by Karger
& Stoesz, supra note 31.
98 Disability ratings could be based on presumed reductions in earnings capacities
caused by the disability and range from 10% to 100% in 10% intervals as is done with
veterans' compensation. Green Book, supra note 6, at 1704.
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refundable tax credits could have a single multipurpose application form, a single
eligibility determination, a single payment system, and standardized administrative
procedures. Moreover, having a single program with universal coverage would
avoid the inequities that result from the gaps and overlaps in coverage endemic to
the current social welfare system.
c. Financing the credits
The general idea here is to replace as many of the current social welfare
programs and tax expenditures as possible with a system of refundable tax credits.
Accordingly, the above-described tax credits should replace the current personal
exemption deductions, the additional standard deduction for the blind and elderly,
and many other tax expenditures. In addition, these tax credits should replace
AFDC, SSI, food stamps, energy assistance, housing assistance, the transfer
component of Social Security,9 9 unemployment compensation, workers'
compensation, and possibly even benefits for veterans, Indians, and other special
groups.
99 Many analysts view Social Security as a lifetime compulsory savings program
with two components: 1) an earnings-related component like an annuity; and 2) a transfer
component like a means-tested welfare program. See Forman, supra note 74.
Under the author's proposed comprehensive system of tax credits, the
transfer component would be distributed through the per capita tax credits and additional
credits for the elderly and disabled. The annuity component could continue on as an
actuarially fair savings program. Cf., Haveman, supra note 22, at 158-63.
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Indeed, much of the financing for these tax credits would come from
cashing out many of the existing social welfare transfer programs and tax
expenditures. In that regard, the money generated as a result of administrative
savings from integrating current social welfare programs and tax expenditures into
the proposed system of refundable tax credits should also be used for financing.
Admittedly, it is politically difficult to actually replace programs. In the
short term, an alternative approach with virtually identical consequences would be
to adopt the proposed refundable tax credit system but require individuals to choose
between participating in the current social welfare system or the proposed
refundable tax credit system. This approach has the disadvantage of initially higher
duplicative costs; however, as the refundable tax credit system grew, the current
social welfare system would shrink, as would its duplicative administrative
costs. 100
100 This same result could be accomplished by what is called full benefit offset
method. Cf., Mirer, supra note 56, at 155-56. Under the full benefit offset method,
everyone could claim their refundable credits; however, the amount of those refundable
credits would be subtracted from their benefits under other programs. Consequently, large
enough refundable tax credits would then eclipse the benefits available under other
programs, and people would stop applying for them.
For example, if a refundable tax credits had to be subtracted from
unemployment compensation benefits, and a worker's unemployment compensation benefits
were less than the worker's refundable tax credits, then the worker would not even bother to
apply for unemployment compensation benefits. In that regard, as family size is not relevant
for unemployment compensation benefits, the unemployment compensation benefits of
workers in larger families would simply be eclipsed by the refundable tax credits.
Such an approach might be critical to finessing the integration of the
transfer component of Social Security benefits into the proposed system of refundable tax
credits. Requiring that the new refundable tax credits be fully offset against a recipient's
Social Security benefits would have the same effect as shifting the transfer component of
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2. Related Programs
Tax credits alone are not enough for an effective social welfare system. In
addition, a comprehensive federal health care plan should ensure that nobody would
lose health coverage by working. Finally, education, training, job-search, and other
social welfare services should be provided at the local level through a single agency.
a. A comprehensive health care plan
The federal government is heavily involved in providing health care
assistance through Medicare, Medicaid, veterans benefits, the exclusion for
employer-provided health insurance premiums, the deduction of health care costs,
the supplemental health care earned income tax credit, federal employee benefits,
and other mechanisms. Indeed, in 1990, the federal government accounted for over
30% ($177 billion) of all personal health spending. 10 1 Also, health care are costs
are growing fast, both as a percentage of the gross domestic product and as a
percentage of the federal budget. Moreover, some 35 million Americans lack
adequate health care coverage. These factors are pushing the federal government
towards developing some type of cost-effective comprehensive health care plan.
Social Security to the new system of refundable tax credits, but it would not cause the same
political uproar that would invariably result from actually "raiding" the trust funds or
otherwise "messing with" Social Security.
101 Green Book, supra note 6, at 286.
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Although the design of such a comprehensive federal health care plan is
beyond the scope of this paper, a few points can be made. First, simply cashing out
the value of federal health assistance programs via refundable tax credits seems like
a poor idea: given the choice between health care protection and other consumption
goods, people tend to under invest in health care protection. Tying refundable tax
credits to specific health care investments would ensure that health care investments
were made; however, it is by no means obvious that such tax credits would be the
most effective way to meet health care needs.
Second, whatever comprehensive health care plan the federal government
develops should ensure that no one will lose health care coverage because of work.
Despite recent changes, the current categorical nature of Medicaid poses work
disincentives. Whatever comprehensive health care plan that the federal
government develops should ensure that individuals are not forced to choose
between working or having adequate health care coverage for themselves or their
dependents.
Finally, it is worth noting that consolidating some of the existing federal
health care programs and tax expenditures should yield significant administrative
savings. At the very least, better coordination of administration and payment
mechanisms would reduce administrative costs. Indeed, standardizing payment
mechanisms could also result in significant private sector administrative savings.
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b. Education. training, and other social welfare services
In addition, an effective social welfare system will invariably need to
provide a broad range of services to beneficiaries. Education, training, job-search
and placement, counseling, and child support collection are but a few that come to
mind. To the extent possible these services should be provided at the local level
through a single social welfare agency. This approach would both reduce
administrative costs and increase beneficiary utilization of these services.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, there are tremendous obstacles to achieving coordination, let
alone integration, among current social welfare programs and tax provisions. At
present, at least, the sheer number of agencies, organizations, and congressional
committees involved in administering and overseeing the social welfare and tax
systems makes even simple coordination efforts difficult. At best, improving
coordination within the current social welfare system is a time-consuming process.
Moreover, there are few rewards for such efforts: the benefits of successful
coordination may be realized in the future or, worse still, by some other agency.
Synchronization and integration efforts seem likely to fare even worse.
Most such efforts require both Executive Branch leadership and congressional
action, and "the goal of simplicity has been singularly without appeal to the framers
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of our tax and welfare laws." 102 Instead, protecting one's turf and power and
catering to organized special interests often seems more important than improving
the delivery of services to constituents.
In short, politics will generally work against coordination, synchronization,
and integration efforts, and such efforts, at times, seem almost quixotic. Still, as
Will Rogers of the author's adopted state, Oklahoma, once said, "This country has
gotten where it is in spite of politics, not by the aid of it."103 Hopefully,
coordination and simplification of the social welfare system can go forward in spite
of politics.
102 Henry Aaron, Discussion [following a paper entitled, A Simulation Analysis
of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects ofAlternative Program Structures:
Negative Income Tax Versus the Credit Income Tax], in Income-Tested Transfer Programs,
supra note, at 212-14, at 214.
103 Will Rogers Says... (Reba N. Collins ed., 1988) at 9 (quote date Nov. 1,
1932).
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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
EXAMINATION TO OPEN MARCH 29, 1993
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) will re-open the
Administrative Law Judge Examination. They are mounting an
aggressive recruitment effort, especially targeted at qualified women,
minorities and the disabled.
If you are interested in learning more about becoming a Federal
Administrative Law Judge, you may obtain information on minimum
qualifications, how to apply, and how to obtain application forms and
materials by calling 912-757-3000 after February 28, 1993. The
telephone is automated, with verbal instructions to follow after entering
"01174" on a touch-tone phone.
You may also write:
Mr. John D. Kraft
Acting Assistant Director for
Administrative Law Judges
Office of Personnel Management
Washington, D.C. 20415-0001
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
c/o National Center for the State Courts
300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798
Membership Application and Questionnaire
Please answer all questions fully. Type or print.
1 ) Name:
(last)
2) Home Address:
(first) (m.i.)
(street) (apt.)
(city) (state) (zip)
Home Tel. #: ( ) Bus. Tel. #: L-1
Title (ALJ, Hearing Officer, etc.):
Name of Agency (in full):
6) Business Address:
(street)
(city)
7) Please Send My Mail To: ____Home
8) Date Of Birth:
9) Are You An Attorney At Law? __ ye
10) My Present Position Is: elected
appointed for indefinite term
other (explain):
11) My Position Is: full time
(state)
___Business Address
-no
_appointed for fixed term
-competitive civil service
part time per diem
(zip)
Year Service Began:
Brief Description Of Job Duties:
14) Academic Degrees & Years Awarded:
15) Awards, Honors, etc.; Other Affiliations (optional):
16) Optional & Confidential: For Use By The Committee On Compensation
Administrative Law Judges & Hearing Officers.
Salary (or salary range) for your present position:
$ per . Salary fixed by:
statute civil service board _ appointing authority
collective bargaining ___other (please explain):
17) ___I am now a member of this association. (I previously joined
NAALJ or its predecessor, NAAHO.)
18) Signature:
Date:
